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in a non-profit setting. In particular, market, reputational and ideological incentives are 
considered. The analysis highlights that new governance rules are necessary. In this 
context a new financial model is analyzed where the competition between for-profit and 
non-profit firms is extended from the products level to that of private financing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  non-profit; managerial discretion; incentives, governance rules 
JEL classification codes  L300; L310; D210; D230  
 
 
 
* University  of Rome “La Sapienza” e-mail: alessandra.antonelli@jus.uniroma1.it 
                       
                                       
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
In the modern welfare states, non-profit organizations have an increasing role. So, 
the economic, sociological and legal literature is interested to this topic in a very 
extensive way. From the economic point of view, two perspectives of analysis can be 
identified: normative and positive analysis. In the first perspective, the economic and 
social role of non-profit organizations is highlighted [WEISBROD 1975; HANSMANN  
1980]. Non-profit sector is considered an effective and efficient alternative to State 
failure or to contract failure. The basic idea is that the non-distribution constraint 
assures an organizational behavior consistent with institutional objectives of the 
organization.  
The second perspective of analysis points out that this constraint is consistent with 
a variety  of behaviors on the part of non-profit organizations. In particular, the 
behavioral models of non-profit organizations [JAMES, 1983; SCHIFF-WEISBROD, 1991; 
BISES 2000] considers self-interested managers whose preferences and objectives are 
different from institutional objectives of organization. The negative effects of 
managerial opportunism and managerial discretion on efficiency and effectiveness of 
organizational activity are pointed out. 
The negative effects of managerial discretion can not be considered exclusive to the 
non-profit sector [WILLIAMSON, 1964; FAMA AND JENSEN, 1983] Nevertheless, the 
possible solutions supplied by economic analyses for profit-oriented firms, such as 
contracts and incentives theories, are not applicable to non-profit organizations. 
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At the same time, the positive theories affect the robustness of normative theories. 
If non-profit activity fails either in efficiency or in effectiveness, its social role as 
solution to State failure or contract failure becomes feeble. 
An important matter, not only from a theoretical point of view but also for policy 
intervention is, therefore, to investigate why positive theories does not confirm 
normative theories and what solutions are implementable in order to coordinate 
efficiency of non-profit organizations with their social role. 
The aim of this paper is to give an answer to the following questions: what are the 
effects of managerial discretion on organizational efficiency of non-profit 
organizations? How different kinds of incentives work in non-profit organizations and 
what is their effectiveness? What are the possible governanance rules of non-profit 
organizations? 
The paper is developed as follow. The economic literature on behavioral analysis 
of non-profit organizations is reviewed in a comparative analysis in section 2. Section 3 
focuses on different types of organizational incentives: market incentives, reputational 
incentives and ideological incentives. In particular, their role and their effectiveness in 
non-profit context are highlighted. Possible governance rules of non-profit organizations 
are analyzed in section 4. In particular, a new financial model and a new control 
structure are analyzed. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.       
 
2. Managerial behavior and efficiency in non-profit organizations 
As the for-profit firms, the non-profit organizations are characterized by 
asymmetric information and imperfect monitoring. In general, the main agency relations 
involves the individuals who fund the organization by different means (i.e. the patrons) 
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and those who effectively run the organization (i.e. the managers). In the case of 
donative organizations, the patrons are donors. Differently, in commercial 
organizations, the agency problem is like the consumer-supplier relations in market 
transactions with imperfect monitoring. 
The basic idea is that, as the monetary remuneration of a non profit manager is 
usually fixed because of non-distribution constraint, the manager will seek to raise his 
remuneration (or his utility level) through power, status, prestige, that is through non-
monetary variables.  To this purpose the informative advantage is strategically used. 
Nevertheless, the effects on organizational efficiency can be different according to 
the stereotypical model of manager adopted. 
Different kinds of managers are proposed from the economic literature. They can 
be summarized in the following types: the power-seeker manager, the income-seeker 
manager and the products mix- oriented manager.    
The power-seeker manager is analysed by NISKANEN [1971] with reference to a 
commercial organization. Like public bureaucrats maximizing budget, this kind of 
manager maximizes sales subject to a balanced budget constraint because managerial 
power is correlated to the dimension of the business. 
From a more general point of view, JAMES [1983] and SCHIFF and WEISBROD 
[1991] consider a multi-product non-profit organization where the production of 
different goods or services is subordinated to a cross-subsidization policy between the 
different activities carried out. In the first case [JAMES, 1983], the non-profit 
organization produces two unspecified goods. In the second case [SCHIFF and 
WEISBROD, 1991], the non-profit activity is oriented to a commercial activity and to an 
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institutional activity with characteristic of public good (for example scientific research, 
health services). 
 Both cases show that managerial discretion has repercussions on the choice of 
levels and mix of activities carried out, because the «only way in which the manager 
can increase his benefits is by altering the mix of services to emphasize those that best 
reflect his preferences. This will lead him to produce more than a profit making 
company would of certain services, and less of others»[JAMES, 1983, p. 351]1. 
The particular mix choosen depends on the manger’s preferences. So, if he/she 
receives negative utility from the commercial activity and positive utility from the 
institutional activity, the manger’s behavior will be oriented to expand the institutional 
activity and to reduce the commercial one [SCHIFF-WEISBROD, 1991]. 
Equally, the product mix will be oriented to the preferred good in the case of two 
unspecified products  [JAMES, 1983].   
Extending previous analyses, Bises [2000] refers to an income-seeker manager 
whose objective function is positively correlated to the institutional activity of the 
organization and to a variable representing the ‘budget surplus’, that is the excess of 
income over expenses, available for ‘discretionary expenses’ 2. So, this manager’s 
behavior is similar to the public bureaucrat’s behavior of Migué and Bélanger [1974] 
and to the mangerial behavior analysed by Williamson [1964]. 
Different implications on the organizational equilibria and efficiency derive from 
the particular manager considered. This following section analyses this point. 
 
                                                           
1For an extensive classification of models of entrepreneurs see YOUNG [1981]. 
2 These expenses are aimed at raising the status, prestige, and power of the manager, as, for example 
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2.1 Equilibria and efficiency of the non-profit organization 
We consider a non-profit activity with two characteristics: a “private” characteristic 
(x),  i.e. commercial activity, and a “public” characteristic (p). 
The last can be, for example, the “quality” of the good/service produced for a pure 
commercial non-profit organization or an “institutional” activity for a  multiproduct 
non-profit organization. 
With given resources, the possible efficient combinations of the two characteristics  
are represented by the frontier in the following figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: the production frontier 
 
 Following Bises [2000], the institutional organizational objective function is 
W=W(x,p) with Wx ≤0 and Wp >0. 
Since x is a “bad or neutral characteristic”3, organization’s equilibrium would be 
A. This is a pure theoretical result, because the public and the private characteristics are 
                                                                                                                                                                              
expenses for personnel expansion or to improvements in the work-environment. 
3In the first case, the indifference curves are increasing  with positive  slope, in the second case are 
horizontal lines. 
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connected each other. In order to assure some level of the public characteristic (the 
quality of the good/service produced or the institutional activity), some level of private 
characteristic (commercial activity) is necessary4. This minimum level of commercial 
activity can be considered as a constraint for the organization. In a more realistic way, 
the organization’s equilibrium will be a point on the upper side of the frontier (for 
example C). 
The managerial objective function is U=U(x,p,M) where M represents the 
“managerial discretionary expenditures”. To simplify, we assume that this utility 
function is a Cobb Douglas function, i.e. U=axαpβMγ with a >0 and α+β+γ<15. 
 
Case 1: the power-seeker manager 
As Niskanen [1971] points out, the power-seeker manager maximizes the sales. 
Then, for this manager γ=0 and β=0. His utlity function becomes U=axα (with a>0) and 
his behavior is like a for-profit manager maximizing sales. The managerial equilibrium 
will be B6 where technical efficiency is assured (because B is on the frontier) but not 
organizational objective.  
 
Case 2: the product-mix oriented manager 
The product-mix oriented manager has a less extreme behavior respect to the 
power-seeker manager. His utility is not correlated to managerial expenditures (γ=0) but 
both activities (characteristics): commercial (private characteristic) and institutional 
(public characteristic). Two cases are possible: the manager likes both activities (case 
2.1) or the manager dislikes commercial activity7 (case 2.2) . 
                                                           
4In the case of institutional activity, some level of commercial activity is necessary for cross-subsidization 
policies because we are not considering pure donative organizations. 
5Assuming the sum of exponents lesser than one, the Cobb-Douglas function is stricly concave. 
6In this case, indifference curves are vertical lines. 
7If the manager likes only commercial activity, we have the case 1: the power-seeker manager. 
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Case 2.1 
γ=0, Ux>0, Up>0. Given the manager’s utility function U=axαpβ (with α, β>0 and 
α+β<1), the indifference curves are well-behaved and the equilibrium is interior (for 
example D). It is on the frontier, then it is efficient from a technical point of view but it 
is characterized by an inefficient product-mix. In particular, there is an over production 
of commercial activity respect to the optimal level for the organization.  
Case 2.2 
γ=0, Ux<0, Up>0 with Ux≠ Vx and/or Up≠ Vp 8. In this case, the manager’s utility 
function is U=axαpβ (with α<0, β>0 and  α+β<1). As in the organization’s objective 
function, the commercial activity is distasteful. Then, the pure theoretical equilibrium is 
A. But since commercial and institutional activities are connected each other, the 
equilibrium carried out is such that some level of private characteristic (commercial 
activity) is performed9. Nevertheless, it is characterized by a different product-mix with 
respect to the mix maximizing the organization’s objective even if technical efficiency is 
satisfied. The managerial equilibrium point is on the frontier, but it is not C.  
 
Case 3: the income-seeker manager 
The utlility of the income-seeker manager is positvely correlated to the managerial 
expenditures. So, γ>0 and  his/she utility funcion is U=U(x,p,M) with Ux≥ or <0, Up>0, 
UM>010. In analytical form it is U=axαpβMγ  (with with α≥ or <0, β, γ>0 and  α+ β+ 
γ<1). 
                                                           
8If Ux=Vx   and Up=Vp the manager has the same objective function of the organization and his behavior is 
such that organization’s objectives are realized.  
9 This is true also if Ux=0. 
10Like the cases 2.1, 2.2 and the note 9, the commercial acivity can be utility improving, neutral or 
 9 
Differently from the previous cases, the optimal manager’s choice is such that 
M>0, but because of managerial expenditures, the frontier becomes A’B’. Managerial 
equilibrium is like the case 2.1 if Ux≥ 0 and  the case 2.2  if Ux<0. In both cases, it is on 
the new interior frontier A’B’. AA’ is the organization’s inefficiency due to managerial 
expenditures. This is a technical and an allocative inefficiency. When the manager uses 
discretionnally some resources, he/she uses greater quantity of inputs respect to the 
minimum quantity and not minimizes costs. As M increases, the possibility frontier 
moves towards to the axis origin and the inefficiency increases.  
 
3. Incentives for non-profit organizations 
Previous section highlights a relevant problem of managerial accountability and 
commitment. The non distribution constraint does not seem an  effective incentive to 
solve this problem. From a general pint of view, the non-profit organizations are similar 
to the public bureaucracies: in most cases, the organization’s results can not be 
measured because their “social or public” content, organizational objectivs are, 
sometimes, multidimensional and there are many principals in the principal-agent 
relationship. Unlike most of public bureaucracy, most of the non-profit organizations 
work in a market setting with for profit firm. In this way they promises greater 
competition and responsiveness to market forces. Then, most of non-profit 
organizations are in an intermediate position between public and private sector. What 
are the effective incentives for this kind of organizations? How does the “traditional” 
economic incentives are modified in this context?   
                                                                                                                                                                              
distasteful.  
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Since contractual incentives, as profit share rules, can not be used in non-profit 
organizations because of the non distribution constraint, we consider the following three 
kind of incentives working in the organizations: market, reputational and ideological 
incentives. The aim is to show how their effectiveness can be modified in a non-profit 
setting. 
 
3.1 Market incentives 
Market incentives operating for the organizations can be divided in two groups:  
property rights incentives (or financial market incentives) and product market 
incentives. 
3.1.1 Property rights incentives 
Most of organizations, for-profit and non-profit, are characterized by the  
“separation of property from control” [FAMA-JENSEN, 1983; WILLIAMSON, 1964]. 
It is widely held that the greater efficiency of for-profit organizations is based on 
the effects that the ownership structure generates on the incentives received by agents 
operating in the organization. From an economic point of view the property rights are 
defined as ‘residual control rights’. They consist in the authority that the holders of the 
right have to “choose, referring to specific goods, any whatsoever utilization within a 
set of non prohibited utilizations” [ALCHIAN, 1965, p. 90], and which confer the status 
of residual claimants.11 Despite the ambiguities deriving from such definition12, it is 
                                                           
11 This is the power to acquire the income deriving from the use of the property resource object after 
having met all contractual obligations [MILGROM - ROBERTS, 1994] 
12 As Milgrom and Roberts [1994] point out, the concept of residual claimant is far from exhaustive. 
When, e.g., a company pays its staff a bonus, increases salaries in favourable periods, or uses various 
incentive techniques linking remuneration to profits, it could be said that some worker are sharing in the 
company’s residual claims?  
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possible to state that the property incentives are realized when the decision-maker fully 
sustains the consequences of his/her choices. 
In a non-profit organization there is no residual claimants. An immediate 
consequence is a larger management discretion, no longer exposed to control and 
sanctioning mechanisms exerted by the property rights market13. 
For-profit organizations with a low-performance, can be subject to the take-over, 
i.e. the acquisition of the control package by groups able to replace the organization’s 
management. Then, the threat of substitution, can constitute a tool to enforce a 
managerial behavior more consistent with organizational objectives14.   
Moreover, the lack of property rights implies that it is not possible to reallocate the 
risk between agents and to reserve the role of “owners” to less risk adverse subjects. 
This might be a partial explanation as to why many non-profit organizations operate in 
sectors (charities, culture, health) with low risk levels, impeding, from a 
macroeconomics point of view, the development of more innovative and risk-taking 
activities.  
At the same time, the lack of a property rights market implies that the ownership 
can not be reserved to subjects acquiring more specific information and knowledge in 
those sectors that they consider more useful and into which they decide to invest their 
wealth. The lack of  “specialization” of ownership reduces the patrons’ incentives to 
efficiently control the behavior of agents working in the organization, in particular of 
the management.  
                                                           
13 i.e. the lack of a corporate control market.  
14 It is, however, necessary to clarify that the corporate control market is not always able to guarantee 
efficient form of manager control. Grossman and Hart [1980] maintain that, with multi-participant 
shareholding, the prevalence of free-riding behaviour neutralizes the efficacy of take-over. In general, the 
effectiveness of corporate control greatly depends on the working mechanisms of the shares market. The 
existence of speculative maneouvres, asymmetric information and transaction costs can alter the 
mechanism of the corporate control market.   
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3.1.2 Product market incentives 
Many non-profit organizations carry out commercial activities in competition with 
for-profit firms. What are the effects of this different organizational objectives on 
market mechanism? 
From a traditional economic point of view, the market is an institution with 
voluntary transactions. In this setting, the different agents’ objectives are made 
compatible each others by the market’s coordination function between the demand and 
supply side. 
With perfect competition the equilibrium is market clearing and the market offers 
endogenous incentives to an efficient uses of resources. This situation changes with 
competition between firms with different objective, i.e. non-profit and for-profit firms.  
When firms’objectives have a prevalent “social” content, the impossibility of their 
misuration (even if partial) can generate “barrier to exit” [HANSMANN, 1980]. 
In particular, this is true for the organizations whose funds are donations or public 
funds not correlated to the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization. In this case, 
the market selection is not oriented towards the more efficient firms and inefficient and 
not effective firms can survive. Their activity is, therefore, justified only for the social 
content. 
Even for pure commercial non-profit in competition with for-profit firms, the 
market selection mechanism can work in a different way respect to the traditional way. 
We consider two cases. In the first case, the non-profit organizations are not 
minimizing costs. They have higher costs with respect to the for-profit commercial 
firms. In the second case they have smaller costs. 
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With non-profit organizations not minimizing costs, inefficient organizations with 
higher costs can survive if their objective is to obtain some resources (even if smaller 
with respect to the others commercial firms) only to finance some level of insitutional 
activity with cross-subsidization policies. [MITTONE, 1996, p.143]. Then there is a weak 
incentive to search technologies costs-saving. 
If non-profit organizations have smaller costs compared to for-profit firms (for 
example because they use voluntary job), their could be, in theory, more competitive. 
Then, from an economics point of view, their market share expands with respect to the 
lucrative firms. Nevertheless, the non-profit organizations not always are able to 
increase their supply as the demand increases, thus leaving market shares to less 
competitive firms. This process occurs because non-profit financial resources (such as 
private donations, revenues from commercial activity or public funds) not always are 
easily and immediately available. In others words, the non-profit organizations can have 
more difficulties to collect capital15 when they need.  
 
3.2 Reputational incentives 
Firms with a “good reputation” on the market have a greater probability of success. 
In order to provide oneself with a good reputation, some firms have to enforce correctly 
the contracts with the consumers. Then, reputation is another source of potential 
incentives for the firms. 
Nevertheless, the incentive to accumulate “reputation” is effective if the consumer 
is able to “punish” any possible opportunist behavior of the organization through the 
exit from the contractual relation.    
                                                           
15Unlike the for-profit firms, the non-profit organizations does not trade in capital assets market.   
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The heterogeneity of goods and services produced from the non-profit sector, their 
social content and the multidimensional objectives of the non-profit organizations make 
not easy for the consumer to acquire informations and to exert some control on 
organization’s activity and/or on the characteristics of the good/service supplied16.   
These informative problems can make less plausible the threat of eventual 
sanctions from the consumer or from the beneficiaries, thereby also reducing the 
effectiveness of reputation mechanisms. The reputation of a non-profit organization 
(with respect to the quality of goods sold or the destination of donations) can be an 
incentive to organizational efficiency when the commercial activity either supplies 
experience goods (services), or is run in a competitive context that permits, at least ex 
post, some comparative evaluation.   
In any case, the reputation mechanism is effective only when there is not any 
rationing of the goods/services on the supply side.  
From the point of view of Weisbrod, for example, the non-profit organizations are 
a private solution to an unsatisfactory supply of public goods as regards both quality 
and quantity. Then, the possible difficulty of obtaining private donations due to the 
organization’s “not very good” reputation can unlikely constitute a credible threat, since 
there are no alternative sources capable of fully satisfying the citizen’s demand for same 
goods or public services. In other words, citizens unsatisfied for the goods/services 
offered by the non-profit sector should appeal to an alternative source, in this case the 
State which,  however, is unable to entirely satisfy the demand. Thus for ‘high-demand’ 
citizens unsatisfied for public supply, the non-profit production can be a source of 
                                                           
16The same informative problems can characterize the relation between consumer and for-profit firm. 
Nevertheless, in non-profit sector they can be more relevant because of the particular nature of some 
activities (i.e. social activities) and the multidimensional objectives of non-profit firms. In this sense, non-
profit organizations are more similar to the public bureaucracy. 
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increased utility, even if the amount or qualitative level of the goods is inferior to the 
quantitative or qualitative level which would maximize their utility. 
 
3.3 Ideological incentives 
A traditional line of reasoning argues that explicit incentives are not necessary in 
non-profit organizations because the agents involved in organization’s activity have 
ideological incentives making their objectives identical to the organization’s objectives. 
This thesis can be acceptable for mutual benefits organizations of small dimension. 
On the contrary, it is not applicable to public benefits organization with a hierarchic 
organizational structure. 
In such cases, the high number of principal-agent relations makes improbable the 
coincidence of the agent’s objectives with the institutional ones of the organization. At 
the same time, where the management is not constituted by patrons but selected on the 
market on the bases of “economic”17 criteria rather than on purely ideological criteria, it 
seems impossible to eliminate any agency problems. 
A parallel thesis [YOUNG, 1983] is based on the idea that in non-profit sector, 
managerial remuneration is lower than in for-profit sector. A manager accepts a lower 
remuneration because he/she is satisfied by working in an organization whose 
objectives reflect his/her ideology. Then, the labour market self-selection is the more 
effective recruiting method for non-profit organizations. However, this thesis seems 
based on the assumption that the labour market works efficiently and its equilibrium is 
market clearing. On the contrary, if the labour market equilibrium is characterised by 
involuntary unemployement, the previous thesis does not hold. In this case, a worker 
                                                           
17 For example on the base of the accumulated human capital. This situation occurs, with high  
probability, in very large organizations, run by “specialized” staff. 
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can be disposed to accept a lower remuneration if the alternative is the unemployement, 
even without any ideological motivation. So, the market labour does not implement any 
self-selection process and managerial opportunism is not eliminated. 
 
4. The fiduciary duties of the administrators: implementation problems and 
possible governance rules of non-profit organizations 
Previous sections highlight a relevant accountability problem in the non-profit 
sector. 
The weakness of incentives implies that principal-agent relations are regulated 
almost exclusively by trust. 
Two questions raise: what are the administrator’s fiduciary duties? How can they 
be implemented?  
Neither it is not possible to give a single definition of fiduciary duties, or to define 
effective implementation mechanisms which are not excessively expensive. It is 
however possible to define a number of important points on the basis of which to 
analyze the question. 
We shall take, as starting point, the responsibility concept proposed by LEAT [1990, 
p. 144]  who locates the responsibilities of the administrators in four diverse typologies 
dealing with:  
a) the appropriate use of funds (accountancy responsibility);  
b) the respect of rules dictated by organizational procedures as set out in the statute 
or internal regulations (procedural responsibility);  
c) the quality of work carried out in the organization and administration of projects 
(program responsibility);  
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d) the destination of work to projects (see point c) or, in general, to activities 
considered ‘priorities’ for the organization (priority responsibilities).  
The definition of precise responsibilities of the administrators of non-profit 
organizations inevitably raises a further question: who are the individuals legitimated to 
act in the event of the violation of same responsibilities?  
An articulated classification of the various responsibilities necessarily involves 
different individuals who could, in different measure, oversee the implementation of 
those responsibilities. If the patrons are mostly interested in an appropriate use of the 
financial resources of the organization or, using Hansmann’s terminology, in evaluating 
the marginal impact of their donation on the organization’s activity (point a), the 
members seem to be the best candidates to evaluate internal organizational aspects 
(points b and c) and finally the beneficiaries probably represent the most suitable 
candidates to exert a control over the quantity and quality of the institutional activities 
of the organization through ex post evaluations (point d).  
However, the selection of many subjects having power to implement precise 
responsibilities, is an expensive solution. The assignment of formal and effective 
legitimacy to different categories of individuals, can result in greater organizational 
rigidity. This means a reduced flexibility and speed of organizational action in offering 
of particular goods or services, which is among the principle motivations in favour of 
non-profit organizations in economic systems. 
HANSMANN [1980] identifies two possible governance rules for the non-profit 
organizations divided in two groups: mutual and entrepreneurial.  
In the first, “control” is carried out by the patrons through the exertion of the right 
to elect the administrators of the organization, who thus become susceptible to possible 
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turnovers even if not dictated by market pressure. The situation reproduced is thus 
basically analogous to the separation of property from control regarding for-profit 
organizations. On the other hand, the governance model of entrepreneurial organizations 
is different because the board of director is “self perpetuating” and thus more similar to 
public bureaucratic models.  
Even if the division proposed by Hansmann occurs in different non-profit 
organizations, it is not satisfactory for different reasons. 
Firstly, the removal or the election of administrators is logically justified in cases 
of mismanagement or, in general, of non-satisfactory performances. Then, it is  
consequential to the collation and elaboration of the information necessary to evaluate 
managerial performance. But non-profit organizations occur in response to contractual 
failures whenever the informative disadvantage of the patrons is such as to make it 
impossible to monitor the contractually-established performances. Then, the patrons are 
not, by definition, able to carrying out efficient controls and evaluation performances. 
Even if these limitations were of minor importance, i.e. in small mutual organizations, 
the enforcement of the fiduciary duties through the possible actions of the patrons is, 
fundamentally, in contrast with the non-profit organization’s economic role to protect 
the consumer and/or donor from self-interested behaviours. In other words, if the 
governance of the non-profit organization is entrusted to the general category of 
consumers or donors, who are then responsible for protecting themselves from any 
opportunistic behaviour, the boundary line between the non-profit and for-profit sector 
is greatly weakened. The latter can also assume a position of relative advantage due to 
its exposure to market pressures and to the mechanisms of corporate control. 
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A possible governance rule can be found by means of a public regulation of the 
sector. However, the centralized solution presents high administrative costs and has to 
operate in an extremely heterogeneous reality. Then, detailed and specific information 
on every organization are necessary.  
 Another possible governance rule is relative to the financial recruiting method of 
non-profit. 
From a strictly financial point of view, the donor of a non-profit organization -the 
patrons-, provides the capital necessary for the organization’s activity, but does not 
acquire any property right within organization. His role is, from this point of view, more 
similar to that of a bondholder who, however, has no direct economic interest in the 
activity of the organization and may therefore have fewer incentives to control the 
organization’s activity. 
Some proposals18 suggest, for non-profit organizations, financial policies through 
the issue of bonds.  
One aspect characterizes these bonds: the capitalized interest and bond’s face value 
are paid after the liquidation of the organization. According this model, the investment 
in a non-profit organization does not give an immediate remuneration. This implies that 
investments are not directed only towards successful organizations but also towards new 
emerging organizations.  At the same time, the bonds’ market assures the mobility of 
investment. 
An immediate consequence is therefore the projection of the non-profit 
organizations into a more competitive context, thus extending the competition with for-
profit organizations on the financial level too.  
                                                           
18See for Italy the Parliamentary Act n. 6, doc. XXI, 2000.  
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A second effect concerns the possible modification of the control powers. In order 
to preserve the non-profit aim, control power could be structured on two levels. One 
level is mainly related to the administrative efficiency of the organization, and the other 
more geared to evaluating the effectiveness of the organization’s activities. In this case, 
the role of member is separated from that of bondholder. The members would thus play 
an active role in fixing organizational policies, while the bondholders would supervise 
the economic and administrative aspects of the organization trough direct access to 
social information, and the exercising of any necessary sanction where the policies of 
the organization are inconsistent with investment security or, in general, in case of 
mismanagement.  
Moreover, the selling of bonds can promote turnover of controlling group and this 
can prevent possible collusion agreements between backers and management. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the effects of managerial discretion on organizational 
efficiency of non-profit organizations in a comparative perspective and the effectiveness 
of different governance rules. Three different types of managers are considered: the 
power-seeker manager, the product-mix oriented manager and the income-seeker 
manager. The analysis shows that, according to the particular type of manager 
considered, different results can arise in term of efficiency. 
Even if the managerial discretion problem is similar to the correspondig problem in 
for-profit firms, for non-profit organizations market, reputational and ideological 
incentives turn out to be weak. This is fundamentally due to the particular nature of 
goods/services produced. Their social content (even if in different measure among the 
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organizations) poses non-profit organizations in a intermediate position between public 
and private economic sector. 
Then, particular governance rules enforcing powers control are necessary besides 
“traditional” incentives. 
A possible suggestion is to extend the competition between non-profit and for-
profit organizations from the products level to that of private financing. Financing 
policies of non-profit organizations which offer them the tangible possibility to access 
debt capital could, on the one hand, reduce sub-capitalization problems and, on the 
other, to modify the backers’ interests as regards organization activity. Their investment 
has both an ethical and an economic content. In order to avoid a possible distancing 
from the non-profit philosophy, the role of backer is separated from that of member. 
Moreover, the bonds of non-profit could be such that their remuneration is not 
immediate. In this case a self-selection of investors could be implemented. Power 
control on economic and administrative aspects of the organization’s activity are given 
to the investors leaving to  the members an active role in fixing organizational 
objectives. 
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